“Clearly the price considered most likely by the market is the true current price: if the market judged otherwise, it would not quote this price, but another price higher or lower.”
— Louis Bachelier (1900)

Are IPO prices set by perps now?

In 1995, Morgan Stanley initially priced the Netscape IPO at $14, suggesting investors should value the company at about $500 million — a seemingly rich valuation for a loss-making startup founded just 16 months earlier.

The bankers then took Netscape executives on a 20-city roadshow where they met with 2,000 potential investors. When they returned to San Francisco and began soliciting orders, the bankers realized their mistake: They had been far too conservative.

The day before trading was set to begin, the bankers recommended that Netscape increase the offering from 3.5 to 5 million shares and double the price. Management wasn’t sure.

An IPO cannot proceed until the board of directors approves the final offering terms. This is usually a formality — the CEO almost always makes the call. In the case of Netscape, though, the board gave the decision careful consideration. It was concerned that $28 did not reflect the company’s uncertain fundamentals and that its new investors might ultimately be disappointed. The company did need the money, though.

“We’d had a problem deciding what the offering price ought to be,” Netscape founder and Chair Jim Clark said. “The trick is to keep the price low enough that buyers find it attractive, but not so low that if it rises substantially the company itself will have left too much money on the table.”

They left a lot of money on the table. The board approved the $28 offering price and the stock opened trading at $71.

Clark didn’t mind, though, because he recognized that the exercise wasn’t just about the money: “An IPO was as much a marketing event as a financial event,” he said later.

The Netscape IPO was a sensational marketing event. Whatever money the company left on the table it earned many times over in free media. This helped make Netscape a household name. Navigator (Netscape’s browser) had 6 million users at the time of the IPO and 38 million less than a year later.

Netscape also set the playbook for every dotcom-era IPO that followed. Companies deliberately underpriced their offerings by larger and larger margins, valuing the headlines the first day of trading would generate over the money they’d leave on the table.

On Dec. 9, 1999, VA Linux priced its IPO at $30. The shares closed their first day of trading at $239.25 for a gain of 698%.

It was the largest underpricing of the dotcom era — and also one of the last. The bubble popped just three months later.

WeIPO

The idea of treating IPOs as marketing events reached its logical extreme with the infamous S-1 filing for The We Company, the parent company of Adam Neumann’s WeWork.

The prospectus made history as the first SEC filing to have a dedication, as if it were a novel:

There were lots and lots of pictures. Rebekah Neumann — Adam Neumann’s wife and WeWork’s “Chief Brand and Impact Officer” — sent photographers around the world to document WeWork’s offices. She chose from the results as if the IPO depended on it. “In some cases,” a history of WeWork reported, “Rebekah and aides pored over thousands of options before making a single selection.”

“It doesn’t feel soulful enough,” she said of some pictures. “Make it look more ’70s.”

The chief brand and impact officer also left her mark on the first thing prospective investors would read, The Prospectus Summary: “Our mission is to elevate the world’s consciousness.”

(I suspect that was also the last thing many investors read.)

The S-1’s final image was of a rainforest (pictured at the top), with an invitation to investors to join WeWork “in creating a better world.”

We’ll never know how many investors made it far enough into the S-1 to see that invite. What we do know is that very few were open to accepting it. The WeWork IPO was cancelled for a lack of demand.

This represented a shocking miscalculation by both Adam Neumann and his bankers.

After years of currying favor with Neumann in hopes of winning the IPO mandate, Morgan Stanley’s bankers told him investors would value WeWork somewhere between $25 billion and $65 billion. 

Neumann was unhappy with that. “You’re not scaling up your enthusiasm as high as it can be,” he told them.

JPMorgan did only a little better on the low end, forecasting that investors would pay between $46 billion and $63 billion.

Goldman Sachs did the best: It made itself the favorite to win the IPO mandate by estimating that investors would value the company between $61 billion and $96 billion.

(Goldman may also have helped its cause by making its pitchbook heavy on photos, interspersed with inspirational quotes from the likes of Mother Teresa, Lin-Manuel Miranda, and Bob Marley.)

Despite the wide range of valuations, they all missed the mark.

As the IPO approached, negative feedback from investors forced the bankers to sheepishly lower their estimate of WeWork’s value to about $47 billion.

But that proved overly optimistic, too.

Immediately after the S-1 was released, WeWork’s bankers still hoped to issue shares at a $20 billion valuation. As criticism — and even mockery — of the S-1 escalated, they lowered their expectations to $15 billion. Finally, when The Wall Street Journal published an exposé of Adam Neumann’s erratic behavior, they realized there was no price at all the deal could get done at.

The IPO was cancelled.

Markets > bankers

Contrary to what bankers have been telling companies for decades, there’s really no way to know what investors will pay for a stock until you go out and ask them. And even then, you’re only speaking to a subset of institutional investors. There’s no way to know what the market will pay for a stock until the market starts trading it.

Fortunately, the market now starts trading stocks well before they IPO — in the form of perpetual futures.

This makes the job of bankers pitching their IPO services much easier: Their valuation range should be the perpetual futures minus 15 to 25%.

When the price range for Anthropic’s IPO — $70 to $78 — was first reported, it seemed like the perpetual futures trading on venues like Hyperliquid had done an excellent job of predicting it. Perps had already been trading around $97 — a typical 20% above the proposed IPO price.

But what if it was the other way around?

Bankers have a long and terrible track record of predicting what investors will pay for IPO shares. Perpetual futures have a short but very good track record of predicting what the market will pay for them.

I don’t know whether Anthropic deliberately priced its IPO 20% below where the perps were trading.

But if the market gets a few more of these right, I suspect future IPOs will be.

Raydium is Solana’s longest-running AMM and now its leading venue for tokenized stocks.

Raydium generated $8.7M in net revenue in Q3 2026, more than triple Q2, and has bought back $206M of RAY since launch. LaunchLab revenue helped drive the rebound.

Raydium handled 51% of Solana’s tokenized asset spot volume. Those pairs generated 40% of Raydium’s swap fees while accounting for less than a fifth of its trading volume.

Virtually all blockchains make money from blockspace, while most stablecoin issuers make money from reserves. Very few businesses have exposure to both. With USDG, Arbitrum becomes one of them, retaining its upside to fee-based revenue should onchain activity recover, while adding a stablecoin revenue line that does not depend on it.

Read the full report from Blockworks to see how we built the model and what the bull case could mean for Arbitrum.